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"ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM" AND LOCALLY UNDESIRABLE
LAND USES: A CRITIQUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE THEORIES AND REMEDIES
DANIEL KEVINt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE subject of "environmental justice" has attracted considera-
ble attention in recent years. Environmental justice advocates
allege that due to "environmental racism," locally undesirable envi-
ronmental land uses (LULUs) such as hazardous waste facilities,
solid waste disposal sites and contaminated industrial sites are dis-
proportionately placed in minority communities.' To remedy this
perceived disproportionality, advocates have sued to prevent the sit-
ing of some environmental LULUs, formulated legal theories that
promise more expansive relief to minority communities and sug-
gested changes in the procedures by which LULU sites are chosen.2
The increased prominence of environmental justice is evi-
denced in several ways. Environmental justice is "one of the fastest
growing areas of legal scholarship."3 The Clinton Administration
made environmental justice "a centerpiece of its environmental
program"4 and promulgated an Executive Order requiring each
t Mr. Kevin is an environmental analyst at the Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory in Berkeley, California. J.D., Golden Gate Univer-
sity Law School (1986); Doctoral Candidacy, University of California, Berkeley
(1982); MA., University of California, Berkeley (1975); BA., University of Califor-
nia, Santa Cruz (1973). Mr. Kevin was an analyst with the U.S. Congressional Of-
fice of Technology Assessment from 1979 to 1987, and worked with private sector
environmental consulting firms from 1987 to 1996. Any opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. See RichardJ. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Ef-
fects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 787, 802 n.56 (1993) [hereinafter
Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice] (finding that "minorities may receive an
unfair share of the environmental risks that are redistributed by environmental
protection [laws]").
2. See generally RichardJ. Lazarus, Environmental Justice and the Teaching of Envi-
ronmental Law, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 1025 (1994) [hereinafter Lazarus, Teaching Envi-
ronmental Law] (discussing views of environmental justice scholars). For a further
discussion of litigation pursuant to environmental justice claims, see infra notes
131-200 and accompanying text.
3. Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Count7y: A Paradox-
ical Trade, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 267, 303 (1994).
4. G. Marc Whitehead, Toxic Tort Litigation: Developing Issues and Their Impact
on Case Preparation and Presentation, C921 A.L.I.-A.BA. 525, 537 (1994).
(121)
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federal agency to formulate an environmental justice strategy.5
Legislative proposals at federal and state levels would mandate ac-
tions thought by their sponsors to advance environmental justice.
Environmental justice advocates have dominated that portion of
law review literature addressing environmental justice issues. Typi-
cally, when discussing effects on minority populations, supporters
of environmental justice focus on three areas. First, environmental
justice advocates argue that LULUs are more likely to be sited in
minority communities than in non-minority communities and that
minority communities accordingly suffer greater impacts from LU-
LUs.6 Second, such advocates assert that these disparate impacts
either arise from racism on the part of proponents of LULU
projects, or are attributable to pervasive racism in society at large.7
Third, supporters of environmental justice suggest that legislative
and judicial remedies should be implemented to halt the siting or
the operation of projects that create disparate impacts.8
This Article will critically examine some of the major assump-
tions underlying these three environmental justice arguments by
addressing the impact, or lack thereof, on minorities. A close ex-
amination of the racial component of environmental justice theo-
ries is particularly appropriate given the dominant role many
environmental justice advocates ascribe to race in decisions to site
projects creating LULUs. Part II of this Article discusses environ-
mental justice rationales. Part III examines environmental justice
remedies, including administrative and legislative relief. Parts IV
and V critique environmental justice rationales and remedies.
Specifically, this Article contends that some of the key argu-
ments supporting environmental justice remedies - that LULUs
disproportionately affect minorities, and that these disproportion-
ate effects are the result of racism - are debatable. Disparate im-
pacts may not be widespread, and to the extent that such impacts
do exist, the disparities can be attributed to factors other than ra-
cism. Absent evidence of intentional discrimination in siting, the
legal foundation is weak for environmental justice remedies which
are race-conscious and based upon disparate impacts alone. This
5. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994).
6. For brevity, disparities in both LULU siting and in impacts from siting are
termed "disparate impacts" in this Article. For a further discussion of dispropor-
tionate effects on minorities from LULU sitings, see infra notes 9-16 and accompa-
nying text.
7. For a further discussion of racism as a source of disparate impacts, see infra
notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of environmental justice remedies, see infra notes
33-60, and accompanying text.
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ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Article further suggests that such remedies would likely expose non-
minority populations to unwarranted adverse impacts. For these
reasons, policy-makers and the judiciary should be cautious in ex-
amining environmental justice issues and in implementing actions
to correct siting disparities.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RATIONALES
Environmental justice advocates argue that LULUs are dispro-
portionately sited in or close to areas populated by disadvantaged
minority groups, and that these sitings are a result of the racism of
siting proponents and/or of the American society in general.
A. LULUs Are Sited Disproportionately in Communities in
Which Most Residents Are Members of Disadvantaged
Minority Groups
Many environmental justice advocates claim that studies of
LULU sitings show that race is the best predictor of hazardous
waste site locations, and that minority groups, specifically Blacks,
Latinos and Native Americans, are disproportionately affected by
these sitings.9 The term "disproportionate" is not explicitly defined
in much of the environmental justice literature. Frequently, envi-
ronmental justice advocates conclude that disproportionality exists
when there are disparate impacts. In its simplest formulation, advo-
cates claim that disparate impacts exist when minority groups, in
particular communities or regions, or across the United States as a
whole, bear greater burdens from LULUs than do Whites.10
Among the studies cited most frequently by advocates as evi-
dence of disproportionate siting are separate documents issued by
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO Report), the
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (UCC
9. Collins & Hall, supra note 3, at 304. Studies "virtually unanimously" con-
clude that "communities of color bear a disproportionate share of... environmen-
tal burdens." Id.
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENwvTL. MGMT., VOLUME I, DOE/EIS-
0200-D, DRAFT WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT FOR MANAGING TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DIsPoSAL OF RADIOACTIVE AND HAz-
ARDous WASTE 6-90 (1995). In its environmental justice analysis for the
management of low-level mixed waste, the Department of Energy defined "dispro-
portionately high and adverse human health effects" as occurring "when the risk
or rate for a minority or low-income population from exposure to an environmen-
tal hazard significantly exceeds the risk or rate to the general population, and,
where available, to another appropriate comparison group." Id. A disproportion-
ately high and adverse environmental impact "refers to an impact (or risk of an
impact) to a low-income or minority community that significantly exceeds the
same type of impact in the larger community." Id.
19971 123
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Study), and by Robert Bullard, a sociologist (Bullard Study). The
GAO Report described the racial and economic characteristics of
census areas located approximately within a four mile range of four
hazardous waste landfills in Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Region IV." Three of the four landfills were located in ar-
eas where the majority of residents were black. 12 The UCC Study
compared 1980 racial and socioeconomic characteristics of postal
zip codes containing commercial hazardous waste treatment, stor-
age and disposal facilities (TSDFs) to all other zip codes in the con-
tinental United States.13 The UCC Study found that zip code areas
with at least one operating TSDF had twice the average proportion
of minority residents than areas without such facilities.1 4 The study
concluded that race is the single best predictor of the location of
such facilities, and that a national pattern existed of disproportion-
ate siting of hazardous waste facilities in communities where minor-
ities made up a large percentage of the population.1 5 The Bullard
Study found that although Blacks made up twenty-eight percent of
the population of Houston in 1980, six of the city's eight in-
cinerators (eighty percent) and fifteen of the seventeen landfills
(eighty-eight percent) were located in predominantly black
neighborhoods.1 6
B. Disproportionate Siting of LULUs in Minority Communities
is Primarily a Result of Racism Against Minorities
Environmental justice advocates frequently allege that the dis-
parate impacts described in the GAO, UCC, Bullard and other stud-
11. U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., SITING OF HAzARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION wrrIH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3
(1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO Report did not determine why the
landfill sites were selected, the population mix of the areas when the sites were
established, the distribution of populations around the sites, how the communi-
ties' racial status compared to other communities in the states concerned or
whether the sites posed a risk to surrounding communities. Id.
12. At the time of the GAO Report, Blacks made up about a fifth of the popu-
lation of Region IV. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DiE: RACE, CLASS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALr" 32 (1994) [hereinafter DUMPING IN DIXIE].
13. COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NAT'L REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOcIO-Eco-
NOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 13 (1987)
[hereinafter UCC STUDY]. Characteristics included the mean household income
and the mean value of owner-occupied housing. Id. at 10.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id.
16. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1395 (1994) [hereinafter
Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses] (citing Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and
the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273 (1983)).
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ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
ies are attributable to racism against minorities. Advocates
interpret these studies to mean that the minority communities are
deliberately targeted for LULU sitings due to active racial bias,
and/or that such communities are disfavored as a result of a more
diffused and generalized societal or institutional racism. Advocates
also contend that the selection of minority communities is en-
couraged by certain frequently encountered characteristics of such
communities, such as meager political and economic power, which
result from racism.
1. Defining Environmental Racism
Two definitions or understandings of environmental racism
are encountered in the environmental justice literature. The first
definition focuses on active racism on the part of proponents of
LULU facilities or agency personnel reviewing siting proposals,
where, environmental justice literature contains many allegations of
racism as a motivation for LULU sitings. 17 According to one com-
mentator, "[p]ublic officials and private industry have in many
cases responded to the NIMBY [Not In My Backyard] phenomenon
using the place-in-[B]lacks'-backyard (PIBBY) principle."18  This
commentator further contended that "[these are] not random sit-
ing[s]. Minority communities are deliberately targeted as sacrifice
zones." 19 The Reverend Benjamin Chavis,Jr., then Executive Direc-
tor of United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice and
one of the founders of the environmental justice movement, stated
that developers and siting officials "deliberate [ly] target [] ... peo-
ple of color communities for toxic waste facilities."20
Some environmental justice advocates further contend that
factors related to socioeconomic class are inadequate to explain dis-
proportionate siting, and attribute some or most siting decisions to
active racial bias by parties seeking to site LULUs.21 One commen-
17. See UCC STUDY, supra note 13.
18. DUMPING IN DixiE, supra note 12, at 4.
19. Michael Satchell, A Whiff of Discrimination?, U.S. NEWS AND WoRLD REP.,
May 4, 1992, at 3435 (citing DUMPING IN DIxIE, supra note 12).
20. Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1396 n.51 (citing Karl
Grossman, Environmental Justice, E. MAG., May-June 1992 at 29, 31).
21. See DUMPING IN DIxiE, supra note 12, at 32-33. As stated by Robert Bullard,
one of the most frequently cited environmental justice advocates, "It] he facility
siting controversy cannot be reduced solely to a class phenomenon because there
is no shortage of poor white communities in the [Southeast] region.... [ Ploor
whites along with their more affluent counterparts have more options and leverag-
ing mechanisms (formal and informal) at their disposal than blacks of equal sta-
tus." Id.
1997] 125
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tator argued that lower class white communities benefit from the
political influence of the white middle class by avoiding hazardous
waste facilities sitings in their communities because, due to segre-
gated housing patterns, poor whites are more likely than minorities
to live in economically varied areas. 22
Although many environmental justice advocates assert that ra-
cial bias underlies most or all LULU siting decisions, advocates also
frequently support a second meaning of the term "environmental
racism" and contend that intentional bias is not necessary for such
racism to exist. To them, the term refers to a broad array of phe-
nomena which need not be tied directly to purposeful discrimina-
tion or racial animus on the part of any particular actor or
institution. For example, Robert Bullard characterized environ-
mental racism as "any policy, practice, or directive that, intention-
ally or unintentionally, differentially impacts or disadvantages
individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color. [Envi-
ronmental racism] ... also refers to the exclusionary and restrictive
practices that limit participation by people of color in decision-mak-
ing boards, commissions, and staffs."23 Bullard further believes that
environmental racism provides benefits for non-minorities while
shifting costs to minorities.2 4 Similarly, in the UCC Study, Benja-
min Chavis, Jr. used the term "environmental racism" to describe
both intentional and unintentional disproportionate imposition of
environmental hazards on minorities.25 A third source described
the phenomenon more simply: "[e]nvironmental racism is a term
used to call attention to the fact that environmental hazards fall
disproportionately on communities of color."26
2. Minority Community Attributes
Many environmental justice advocates allege that minority
communities become hosts of LULUs due to community attributes
that are the products of racism. One common argument is that
minority communities possess insufficient political power to avoid
being the targets of LULU siting. Advocates argue that minorities
are underrepresented in governing bodies that make siting deci-
22. Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394,
399400 (1991).
23. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environ-
mental Racism, LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 6 (emphasis in original).
24. DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 12, at 98.
25. UCC STUDY, supra note 13, at 395.
26. Collins & Hall, supra note 3, at 303 n.225.
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sions.2 7 Frequently, environmental justice advocates trace the lack
of minority political power to past and present racism in American
society as a whole.28 Some advocates argue that to the extent that
the democratic process in the United States actually reflects the will
of the majority, the process itself produces injury to minorities.2 9
Similarly, advocates allege that, due to racism, minority com-
munities in general are poorer than non-minority communities.30
This places minority neighborhoods at a disadvantage in resisting
siting decisions, as more affluent communities are better able to
marshal economic resources, as well as political and social contacts,
to oppose LULU siting.3 1 Similarly, minority communities are at-
tractive to persons seeking to site LULUs because of their lower
land values as compared with non-minority communities.3 2
27. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and
Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 921,
925-27 (1992).
28. Dick Russell, Environmental Racism, 11 THE AMICUS J. 22, 25 (1989). As
stated by Barry Commoner, "[t]here is a functional link between racism, poverty
and powerlessness, and the chemical industry's assault on the environment." Id.
(quoting Barry Commoner).
29. See Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to
Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366, 391
(1992). "[L] ocal governments are democratically elected, and therefore, account-
able to their constituents. This view, however, obscures the fact that local govern-
ment is often totally unwilling to address the needs of minority residents. Indeed,
the majoritarian process has frequently failed to protect racial minorities and the
poor from the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites." Id. (citations omitted).
"Public perception ... will reflect the concerns of the majority, particularly those
with the resources to be heard, and may discriminate against the disadvantaged
minorities. Under the prevailing regime of response to public perceptions, the
poor and minorities have suffered disproportionately from environmental and
other safety hazards." Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Contro 24 ENvTL. L.
887, 937 (1994). See also Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination:
The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting
Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211 (1994) (urging heightened level of public
participation).
30. Godsil, supra note 22, at 399. "Most [commentators] argue that minority
communities are targeted for hazardous waste facilities and other environmental
hazards by waste-management firms because their residents are more likely to be
poor and politically powerless." Id. Impoverished communities lack the "financial
and technical resources necessary to resist environmentally hazardous facilities."
Hope Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models ofJustice, 14 STAN. ENvTL.
L.J. 3, 10-12 (1995).
31. Godsil, supra, note 22, at 399. For example, wealthier communities are
better able to afford the costs of litigation, and are more likely to have residents
who are attorneys and are aware of legal options for opposing LULU siting. Id.
32. Collins & Hall, supra note 3, at 304.
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REMEDIES
Whatever the source of disparate impacts in LULU siting, the
existence of such impacts is seen by most environmental justice ad-
vocates as conclusive evidence of injustice. To rectify disparate im-
pacts, advocates have suggested administrative, legislative and
judicial remedies.
A. Administrative and Legislative Remedies
1. Agency Actions
The Clinton Administration's Executive Order 12,898, Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority and Low In-
come Populations,3 3 directed each federal agency to make environ-
mental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing the
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmen-
tal effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority and-
low-income populations.3 4 Specifically, each agency was directed to
develop an environmental justice strategy to promote enforcement
of all health and environmental statutes in areas with minority
populations and low-income populations; to ensure greater public
participation; to improve research and data collection relating to
the health of and environmental hazards in minority populations
and low-income populations; and to identify differential patterns of
consumption of natural resources among minority populations and
low-income populations. Agencies were directed to conduct their
programs, policies and activities that substantially affect human
health or the environment in a manner that will not exclude popu-
lations from participation in, or denying the benefits of, or subject-
ing persons to discrimination because of race, color or national
33. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994).
34. Id. President Clinton provided a separate memorandum to Executive Or-
der 12,898 describing the Administration's commitment to environmental justice
issues.
The purpose of this separate memorandum is to underscore certain pro-
vision [sic] of existing law that can help ensure that all communities and
persons across this Nation live in a safe and healthful environment. Envi-
ronmental and civil rights statutes provide many opportunities to address
environmental hazards in minority communities and low-income commu-
nities. Application of these existing statutory provisions is an important
part of this Administration's efforts to prevent those minority communi-
ties and low-income communities from being subject to disproportion-
ately high and adverse environmental effects.
8
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origin.3 5 The Order further directed the Administrator of EPA to
convene an interagency federal Working Group on Environmental
Justice, which will provide guidance to agencies on criteria for iden-
tifying such effects. 3 6 The Order did not, however, define a meth-
odology for agencies to determine whether their activities have
disproportionate effects.37
Pursuant to Executive Order 12,898, federal agencies estab-
lished entities within their jurisdictions to address environmental
justice issues. For example, EPA established an Office of Environ-
mental Equity to serve as the focal point for equity concerns and to
provide oversight for that agency.38 Further, that Office formed a
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, to "bring the is-
sue of environmental racism to national attention and provide a
forum to address the issue."3 9 Similarly, the Department of Energy
(DOE) has an Office of Environmental Justice and Research within
the Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, as well as an
Environmental Justice Steering Committee, a Working Group on
Environmental Justice and a Center for Environmental Justice
Information. 40 DOE's draft environmental justice guidelines
directed the Office of Environmental Management to include envi-
ronmental justice as a factor for the periodic assessment of the com-
pliance of DOE units with regulatory and other statutory
35. Id. Particular race- and income-conscious actions that agencies were di-
rected to undertake included:
[C]ollect, maintain, and analyze information assessing and comparing
environmental and human health risks borne by populations identified
by race, national origin, or income . . . [and] determine whether their
programs, policies, and activities have disproportionately high and ad-
verse health or environmental effects on minority populations and low-
income populations; ...
[Clollect, maintain, and analyze information on the race, national
origin, income level, and other readily accessible and appropriate infor-
mation for areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have a substan-
tial environmental, human health, or economic effect on the
surrounding populations, when such facilities or sites have become the
subject of a substantial Federal environmental administrative or judicial
action. Such information shall be made available to the public, unless
prohibited by law.
Id. § 3-302.
36. Id. § 1-102.
37. Id.
38. Charles S. McCowan, Jr. & J. Randy Young, "Intent" in Environmental Ra-
cism is Hard to Prove But Plaintiffs May Not Have To, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1994, at
3B.
39. Marianne Lavelle, Clinton Pushes on Race and Environment But Civil Rights
Advocates See Mixed Signals from Washington, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 1.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PRE-DEcISIONAL DRAFT, PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL
JusTicE STRATEGY (1994).
1997]
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requirements and to provide incentives for managers to consider
environmental justice issues. 41
EPA's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(OSWER) has taken the position that a statutory amendment to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act42 (RCRA) would be re-
quired to allow EPA, in response to allegations under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,43 to base RCRA permitting decisions on
socioeconomic discriminatory effects that are unrelated to protec-
tion of human health and the environmeht.44 However, where
complaints or comments concerning a RCRA facility allege dispro-
portionate effects on human health or the environment, EPA has
authority to consider and respond to those concerns by taking ac-
tion on a permit application, including refusing to issue a new per-
mit pending full consideration of potential health effects. 45 In
response to a request from EPA Region VI on how to respond to
environmental justice-based challenges to issuances of RCRA per-
mits, OSWER Headquarters instructed the Region to be prepared
to address all environmental justice comments before arriving at
any final permitting decisions.46
2. Legislation
To date, no state or national governing body has enacted legis-
lation incorporating environmental justice remedies. A California
legislative proposal would have required agencies to collect demo-
graphic data, including racial composition, about areas where haz-
41. Id. at 33 (discussing examples of departmental strategies to reduce envi-
ronmentally hazardous risks to minority or low-income populations).
42. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) §§ 3001-5006
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1994)) (RCRA facilities in-
clude commercial hazardous waste TSDFs).
43. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) §§ 601-06 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1994)). For a further discussion
of Title VI, see infra notes 161-77, and accompanying text.
44. U.S.E.PA, OSWER ENvrL. JUsTIcE TASK FORCE DRAFT FINAL REPORT
(1994), at 13-14. This document states that under section 3005 of RCRA, EPA
"shall issue a permit" to facilities complying with RCRA provisions. Id. (citing
RCRA, § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925).
45. Id. at 13.
Section 3005(c)(3) [of RCRA] requires EPA to add to a permit such
terms or conditions necessary to protect human health and the environ-
ment. EPA has interpreted this . . . provision to authorize denial of a
permit to a facility in extraordinary circumstances where EPA determines
that there are no additional permit terms or conditions that would ad-
dress unacceptable risk that would be posed by a facility's operation.
46. Id. at 13-14.
10
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ardous or solid waste facilities were proposed to be sited.47 On the
national level, the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 199348 was a
noteworthy attempt to incorporate racial criteria into evaluations of
siting approvals. Under this bill, citizens of the targeted state could
challenge a waste facility siting if the proposed facility was to be
placed in an "environmentally disadvantaged community."49 Chal-
lenges could be based on the following grounds: (1) the proposed
location of the facility is within two miles of another waste facility,
Superfund site or facility that releases toxic contaminants; (2) the
proposed location is within a community that has a higher than
average percentage of low-income or minority residents; and (3)
the proposed facility may adversely affect the human health or envi-
ronmental quality of the community. Facility proponents could de-
feat a challenge if they could show that no alternative location
within the state poses fewer risks and that the facility either would
not release contaminants or would not increase the cumulative im-
pact of contaminants upon residents. 50 Another legislative attempt
designed to incorporate racial criteria into the siting process was
the Public Health Equity Act.51 If enacted, this bill would have re-
quired federal agencies providing financial assistance to states, local
governments or private entities to promulgate regulations, pursu-
ant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, barring intentionally discrimi-
natory acts and acts with "discriminatory effects."52
One environmental justice advocate has suggested that state
governments declare as an objective the eradication of race-based
inequalities in the burdens of hazardous waste facilities upon mi-
47. CAL. A.B. 2212, Regular Sess. (Cal. 1993-94). The Bill would have prohib-
ited agency approval of a permit for a "potentially high impact development" un-
less the permit application included a description of specified demographic data
of the census tract in which the development is located, and of all contiguous
census tracts. Id. at 1. Required data included race, ethnicity, percentage below
poverty level and percentages below age 5 and above age 65. Developments so
regulated would have included hazardous waste and non-hazardous solid waste fa-
cilities. Id. at 3.
48. H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993).
49. Id.
50. 139 CONG. Rxc. El106-07 (daily ed. April 30, 1993) (remarks of Congress-
woman Collins). This bill was supported by the National Council of Churches and
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, among other organizations.
51. S. 1841, 103d Cong. (1994). This bill sought to "prohibit discrimination,
on the basis of race, color or national origin, in programs and activities relating to
occupational and other exposure to hazardous substances." Id.
52. Id. These regulations would explicitly address actions that result in "dis-
proportionate exposure" to hazardous substances on the basis of race, color or
national origin. Id. § 2702(b) (1).
19971
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nority communities.53 State agencies should take into considera-
tion the racial and socioeconomic makeup of candidate sites for
waste facility siting and remove sites that are in predominately mi-
nority areas from the inventory of candidate sites if existing facili-
ties are disproportionately sited in minority communities. 54 In
addition, Congress should pass legislation creating a disparate im-
pact model of discrimination for hazardous waste facility sitings.55
Under this model, plaintiffs challenging a siting decision would
have the initial burden of showing that the siting would result in a
disparate burden, in terms of the populations that would be physi-
cally or financially harmed by the site, on a minority community as
compared with white communities. 56 For siting to proceed, defend-
ants would have to show that the siting decision is an "environmen-
tal necessity" by proving that the chosen site is environmentally
suitable to safely dispose of the wastes and, if alternate sites are
available, that the particular site in question is necessary to do so.5 7
As part of its evaluation, the court could consider uncontrolled
toxic waste facilities and other environmental hazards unrelated to
the proposed facility as part of the total harm to the community. 58
* Under this model, increased costs at alternate sites would not a pri-
oi justify siting the facility in a minority area.59 If the additional
cost to the facility would bar its development, the court would have
53. Godsil, supra note 22, at 425-26.
54. Id. See also Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENWrL: LJ. 495 (1992) (stating that "[o ] ne
of the major obstacles confronting the environmental problem-solving process is
that... [it] has failed to include the concerns of minorities and the poor. The
benefits and burdens of industrial and economic expansion have been and con-
tinue to be spread disproportionately"); Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice,
supra note 1, at 802 n.56 (exploring policy decisions to address potential distribu-
tional inequities in environmental protection).
55. Godsil, supra note 22, at 421. This model is based on judicial interpreta-
tions of Tite VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to
2000e-17 (1994) dealing with discrimination in employment situations. Essen-
tially, this commentator urges a "'disparate impact' model of discrimination for
hazardous waste facility sitings, aimed at the consequences of site selection rather
than the motivations." Godsil, supra note 22, at 422 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
56. Godsil, supra note 22, at 422.
57. Id. at 422-23. The plaintiff could present rebuttable evidence that alterna-
tive sites were available. Id. at 423. In the event that the plaintiff presented such
evidence, the defendant could then show that the chosen site was "necessay to
safely dispose of hazardous wastes." Id. (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 423-24.
59. See id. at 423 n.217.
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to balance the state's need for the site against the site's impact on
the community.60
B. Litigation
Environmental justice advocates have brought litigation in spe-
cific instances of LULU sitings based upon the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and have suggested additional legal bases for halting siting
attempts. Examples and underlying rationales of such litigation,
and problems encountered by environmental justice advocates in
the judicial system, are discussed in Section V.
IV. CRITIQUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RATIONALES
There are two key flaws in the environmental justice arguments
summarized in Part II of this Article. First, disparate impacts in
LULU sitings appear to be overstated by environmental justice ad-
vocates. Second, to the extent that disparate impacts exist, there is
little evidence that racism in the sense understood by most people
- actions motivated by bias against a racial group or groups - has
been a material factor in the majority of LULU sitings in minority
communities. Disparate impacts in LULU sitings are attributable to
other factors.
A. LULU Siting May Not Be as Disproportionate as
Environmental Justice Advocates Claim
As one commentator concluded, "[n]otwithstanding the grow-
ing significance of the environmental justice movement, few rigor-
ous studies have been conducted that satisfactorily establish a
statistically significant correlation between a community's race and
socioeconomic status and its exposure to disproportionate environ-
mental risks or impacts."61 There are sufficiently important meth-
odological problems with some of the more prominent studies that
many environmental justice advocates rely upon to warrant caution
in accepting claims of disproportionality at face value.
A study by Douglas Anderton, et. al (Anderton Study) of haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities in the United
States that opened for business prior to 1990 and were still open in
1992, and about which data could be found on the level of census
60. Id.
61. Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets "Environmental Racism," NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 28.
1997]
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tracts (about eighty-five percent of such facilities), came to very dif-
ferent conclusions than the UCC and other studies cited by many
environmental justice advocates. 62 The Anderton Study found that
there were no statistically significant differences between the per-
centages of Blacks and Hispanics in census tracts with TSDFs and in
tracts without such facilities.63 In other words, there was no correla-
tion between the presence of these minority groups and the pres-
ence of a TSDF.64 The study also found that there were statistically
significant correlations between the presence of a TSDF and the
following socioeconomic factors: lower employment rate of males,
employment in industrial occupations and lower housing values, as
compared with non-TSDF tracts. 65 Of these factors, "the most sig-
nificant and consistent effect on TSDF location of those [factors]
.. considered is that TSDFs are located in areas with larger propor-
tions of workers employed in industrial activities, a finding that is
consistent with a plausibly rational motivation to locate near other
industrial facilities or markets." 66
The discrepancies between the results of the Anderton Study
and the findings of the UCC Study stem from the differences in
geographic units of analysis chosen by the researchers. 67 The zip
code areas used in the UCC Study are larger than the census tracts
used in the Anderton Study. The use of these larger units increases
the percentage of Blacks in particular. The Anderton Study found
that when census tracts within a two and a half mile radius of TSDFs
were aggregated, the percentage of black residents was greater than
the percentage of Blacks in census tracts containing TSDFs.68
62. Douglas A. Anderton, et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Environmental Eq-
uity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REv. 123, 129 (1994) [hereinafter
Anderton Study].
63. Id. at 129-33. The study analyzed eight census tract characteristics. Two
variables, percentages of black and hispanic persons, related to race and ethnic
compositions. Id. at 129. Three variables encompassed economic conditions of
the populated area. Id. Three variables indicated the industrial and housing char-
acteristics of the census tract area. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 136.
67. Compare Anderton Study, supra note 62, with UCC STUDY, supra note 13.
68. Anderton Study, supra note 62, at 131, 134-36. Nonabutting tracts, which
did not contain TSDFs nor abut TSDF tracts, especially those on the periphery of
the two and a half mile radius studied for each TSDF, contained significantly
larger proportions of black residents, equalling thirty-three percent of the popula-
tion, than did TSDF tracts, equaling twelve percent, or adjacent tracts, equaling
sixteen percent. Id. at 134.
Probing the Anderton Study's results, Robert Bullard stated that the fifteen
percent of sites outside of the census tracts covered by the Anderton Study include
many sites, including several landfills with relatively large capacities, that are lo-
14
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There are no firm guidelines on how to define the geographic
extent of areas that are potentially affected, in terms of health,
property values and other indicators, by the presence of TSDFs.
However, it is likely that data derived from census tracts produce
more defensible statistical results than do data based on zip code
areas. Accordingly, it is likely that the Anderton Study is more relia-
ble than the UCC Study.69 Census tracts are designed to be homo-
geneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status
and living conditions.70 In contrast, zip code areas are basically ge-
ographic designations, intended to maximize the transportation
efficiency of postal deliveries. 71 Thus, any homogeneity within zip
codes is fortuitous, rather than being present by design.
Assuming that greater impacts are experienced by individuals
closer to a TSDF, census tracts containing a TSDF would logically
bear the greatest potential burdens. If there is no correlation be-
tween minority populations and TSDFs within census tracts, then
the core environmental justice arguments that minorities are
targeted for the siting of TSDFs and that minorities disproportion-
ately bear the burdens of such siting are weakened. If a larger per-
centage of minorities are found within a radius of several miles of
TSDFs than is found in the national population, this is arguably due
to the larger percentages of minorities in industrial areas in gen-
eral, which occurs regardless of the presence of TSDFs.
Even some environmental justice advocates have criticized the
UCC Study for shortcomings in its statistical methodology. 72 The
UCC Study relied on current demographic data rather than the
demographic data pertaining to the time when the initial siting de-
cision may have been made. The UCC Study also equated the siting
of toxic facilities with exposure to toxic releases. 73 Further, the
cated in minority areas. Robert Bullard, Letter, 36 ENV'T October 1994, at 3-4.
However, while mentioning several examples, Bullard did not present data on
what proportion of this fifteen percent of sites is located in minority areas.
69. See Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1402-03 (discuss-
ing advantages of using census tracts as unit of analysis).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADM., BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, MAPS AND MORE 3 (1994).
71. Telephone Interview with Xavier Valencia, U.S. Postal Service, Address
Management Office, Oakland, California (June 22, 1995).
72. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and
Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL.
L. REv. 1047, 1130 (1994) (criticizing the UCC Study's inattention to timing con-
cerns); Lazarus, Pursuing EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 1, at 802 n.56 (criticizing
the UCC Study's equating toxic sites with exposure to toxic releases).
73. A contrasting industry view was stated by Joan Z. Bernstein, Vice President
of Environmental Policy and Ethical Standards at Waste Management, Inc.:
1997]
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UCC Study's own findings showed little difference between the na-
tionwide percentages of whites and minorities who live near aban-
doned hazardous waste sites.74
Robert Bullard's study of incinerators and landfills in Houston
also contains methodological problems. Bullard did not explain
the methodology used to arrive at his findings. 75 For example,
rather than census tracts, Bullard used "neighborhoods" as his unit
of analysis, but did not specify how he defined this term; thus, it is
difficult to evaluate the accuracy of his analysis. 76 Bullard classified
some neighborhoods as predominantly minority based on his own
observations, despite census data showing that the census tract con-
cerned was predominantly white.77 Additionally, Bullard may have
left some solid waste sites out of his analysis. 78 Therefore, depend-
ing upon the demographics of the location of the sites, Bullard's
conclusions about disproportionate impacts may be inaccurate. 79
The bulk of the existing research on site demographics com-
pares current racial and income characteristics of host communities
to those of communities that do not host LULUs. Commentator
Vicki Been has observed that existing research is insufficient to de-
termine whether the siting process placed LULUs in geographic ar-
eas that contained a disproportionate percentage of minorities at
the time that the areas were selected to host LULUs, or whether
such areas became predominantly minority after the LULU siting
decisions were made.80 It is possible that the percentages of minor-
There is... a great deal of misunderstanding about the health risk posed
by living near a waste facility. Because risk is a function of exposure,
rather than proximity, there is very little basis, in fact, for the public's
fear. In other words, living near a facility does not mean an individual
would be exposed to contamination, even if there were a problem at the
facility. For example, a landfill that leaks and contaminates the soil be-
neath it would not necessarily affect the residents living near the landfill
who never come in contact with soils several hundred feet underground.
Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An Evolution of Community
Land Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 83, 85 (1991) (emphasis in original).
74. See Satchell, supra note 19, at 35 (citing UCC STUDY, supra note 13). The
percentages of each race that resides near an abandoned waste site are: Whites,
fifty-four percent; Blacks and Hispanics, fifty-seven percent; Asians, fifty-three per-
cent; and Native Americans, forty-six percent. Id.
75. For a full discussion of Robert Bullard's Houston studies, see Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1400-06 and app.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1401 n.72.
78. Id. at 1400 n.69, 1407.
79. Id. at 1400 n.69. Vicki Been recognized that "if Professor Bullard analyzed
fewer than all of the sites in ... [the neighborhood designations], his conclusions
about the disproportionate siting of facilities obviously would be inaccurate," Id.
80. Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1384-85.
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ities in affected communities increased after siting decisions were
made, thus, overstating the amount of disproportionality. The phe-
nomenon of persons "coming to the nuisance" could have taken
place: the presence of LULUs could depress property values, mak-
ing housing cheaper, thus making such areas attractive to lower in-
come households. 81
Been analyzed two frequently-cited reports, the GAO Report
and the Bullard study.82 Addressing the GAO Report, she con-
cluded that a "coming to the nuisance" phenomenon did not take
place: the communities involved were predominantly minority at
the times she estimated that the siting decisions were made and
there were no increases in the percentages of Blacks living in those
communities. 83 In addition, Been found no correlation between
the presence of landfills and declining land values. 84 Examining
the Bullard study, Been found that the census tracts involved were
predominantly black at the time of LULU siting. However, after
siting, the percentage of black residents increased by a larger
amount in these tracts than in Houston as a whole, and land values
decreased, providing evidence that market factors contributed to
the disproportionate effect of siting upon minorities.85 Been con-
cluded that additional research should be conducted to identify
which came first in the communities impacted by LULUs, the LU-
LUs or the "people of color and poor," and also to trace changes in
the demographics of host neighborhoods following sitings.8 6
B. Factors Other Than Racism Account for Disparate Impacts
Environmental justice advocates often combine two classes of
LULUs in their efforts to attack environmental racism: TSDFs that
undergo a formal siting process which incorporates environmental
review and contaminated sites resulting from lax environmental
standards and industrial and commercial practices. 87 However,
81. Id. at 1388-89. Also, residents with the means to move out would probably
do so, intensifying the concentration of low-income people in the area. Id. at 1388.
Summarizing available data, Been concluded that most studies show that hazard-
ous waste sites have a statistically significant adverse impact on surrounding prop-
erty values, while there is a split in opinion regarding the effect of solid waste
landfills and incinerators. Id. at n.19.
82. Id. at 1398-1405.
83. Id. at 1398-99.
84. Id. at 1390-1400.
85. Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1400-05.
86. Id. at 1046. See also Vicki Been, Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses: Direc-
tions for Further Research, 5 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 110 (1993-94).
87. See, e.g., 139 CONG. Rzc. El 106-07 (daily ed. April 30, 1993) (statement of
Congresswoman Collins). For example, in her introduction of the Environmental
1997]
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these two categories present analytically distinct problems. For ex-
ample, compared to most industrial facilities, a TSDF's formal siting
process includes far more regulated criteria for selecting site loca-
tions and a more extensive public participation and comment pro-
cess. Therefore, as a general rule, it is more difficult to establish
what considerations led to the siting of individual industrial facili-
ties. Still, certain generalizations can be made about both classes of
LULUs.
To the extent that disparate impacts in the location of LULUs
exist, environmental justice advocates are not persuasive in tracing
the cause of disparities to racism. There has been insufficient anal-
ysis of non-racial factors as causes of disparate impacts or unequal
results in siting.88 Persons reviewing environmental justice claims
should consider an alternate hypothesis: all things being equal,
both public and private sector actors desiring to site LULUs seek
out locations which meet certain physical criteria, 89 (e.g., geological
stability, soils with low permeability, and absence of shallow ground-
water) are inexpensive in relation to similar locations, and are lo-
cated near other existing industrial facilities. Other favorable
locations are those in proximity to existing transportation routes
and in areas that have low or non-existent local opposition. For
example, the Anderton Study found that the location of TSDFs is
best correlated with the employment of workers in industrial activi-
ties, a conclusion consistent with decisions to site LULUs near
other industrial facilities or markets. 90 Absent more concrete evi-
dence of racial animus, disparate impacts or unequal results should
Equal Rights Act of 1993, Congresswoman Collins in the same paragraph refer-
enced both abandoned toxic waste sites nationwide and city-owned solid waste
landfills in Houston as examples of unjustifiably severe health hazards faced by
minorities and the poor. Id. As Bullard noted, "Black communities became the
dumping grounds for various types of unpopular facilities, including toxic wastes,
dangerous chemicals, paper mills, and other polluting industries." DUMPING IN
DrxIE, supra note 12, at 36.
88. Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 16, at 1392. For example,
Been concluded that market dynamics have been largely ignored by the current
research on environmental justice. Id.
89. Bernstein, supra note 73, at 83-84. In the past, waste disposal sites were
primarily chosen because "they were considered undesirable for other purposes."
Id. at 84. Ideal locations for disposal sites included flood plains, swamps and wet-
lands. Id. With a rise in environmental awareness, these areas became "completely
inappropriate .. .for land disposal." Therefore, industrial sites were favored be-
cause they are typically "available at low cost or are sparsely populated." Id. Over
the past several decades, waste industries have reevaluated their criteria for identi-
fying attractive site areas. Id. Industry methods have shifted "from considerations
that were primarily financial to considerations that reflect the priority of protect-
ing human health and the environment." Id.
90. Anderton Study, supra note 62, at 133.
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be considered disproportionate only when other, non-racial factors
do not explain siting.91
Even where non-racial factors explain siting decisions, such de-
cisions are still subject to critical examination. Siting proponents
may impermissibly focus on cost considerations rather than physical
criteria relating to safety, and are likely to prefer to locate LULUs
in settings where regulation is relatively less stringent. Siting deci-
sions can and should be challenged when there is evidence that
harm to human health or the environment may result.
1. Facilities undergoing formal siting
Nondiscriminatory factors account for disparate results in the
great majority of formal siting decisions. Some hazardous waste
landfill sites which are often cited as examples of environmental
racism, such as Emelle, Alabama and Warren County, North Caro-
lina, may be technically superior to alternate sites.92 For example,
when Chemical Waste Management made its decision to site a haz-
ardous waste landfill, Emelle was the only county east of the Missis-
sippi River evaluated by EPA and listed as one of the ten most
desirable counties for a landfill. 93 Factors accounting for its desira-
bility as a landfill included the sparse population surrounding the
site, reliable access to the site, and arid temperature in the site's
location. 94 Most importantly, Emelle was underlain by dense natu-
ral chalk forming a good barrier between waste disposal activities
and aquifers.9 5
Other factors being equal, and independent of racism, siting
proponents seek out areas where the costs of siting are low relative
to comparable areas.96 Minority communities are often in areas
91. An example of the conceptual problems in claiming racial disproportion-
ality is shown by LULU sitings in the Northeast United States. Most proposed sit-
ings in that region have been in mostly white rural areas. Gerrard, supra note 72, at
1130. These areas are "disproportionately" white when compared to national per-
centages of the white population in those states or in the United States as a whole.
Id. at n.542.
92. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (regarding Warren County); Bern-
stein, supra note 73, at 86 (regarding Emelle).
93. Jane Seigler, Environmental Justice: An Industry Perspective, 5 MD. J. CoN-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 59, 64 (1994).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Bernstein, supra note 73, at 84. Generally, disposal sites are located on
unused and unsuitable land. Id. As a result of lower economic demands and di-
minished land value, these areas are more attainable to residents of lesser means
than other geographic areas. Id. Similarly, once waste facilities are sited, adjacent
land becomes less desirable to other residents "with the ability to make an eco-
nomic choice" to live elsewhere. Id.
1997]
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with lower land values.97 In addition, although the assertion that
"no one likes to live near a waste site"98 is probably correct, in some
instances there has not been strong opposition from minority com-
munities that have been or would be affected by a LULU siting.99 It
is reasonable to conclude that lack of opposition has resulted from
the same factors that have been cited in the cases of white commu-
nities which have solicited LULUs; as well as potential problems,
LULUs can bring potential benefits to communities in jobs, reve-
nues and direct provision of social services. 100
In some cases, not only has there been a lack of local opposi-
tion to LULU sitings, but community leaders have actively sought
out or welcomed such sitings. For example, the Campo Band of
Mission Indians has supported the construction of a solid waste
landfill on reservation land in San Diego County, California. 101
Permitting and environmental standards for the landfill would
meet, at a minimum, applicable EPA standards. 10 2 The landfill
97. See Maria Ramirez Fisher, On the Road From Environmental Racism to Envi-
ronmental Justice, 5 VIL. ENvIL. L.J. 449, 459 (1994) (stating that "[s]ince commu-
nities of color often have low property values, they will be considered for disposal
sites more often than white communities having higher property values").
98. Collin, supra note 54, at 502.
99. Id. at 512. Even some environmental justice advocates concede that there
often is low local opposition to LULU sitings from minority communities, or at
least less than there would be from non-minority communities. Id.
100. The case of the Emelle site is again instructive, where a hazardous waste
landfill has brought in jobs and millions of dollars in revenues to an economically
depressed area.
When Chem Waste acquired the (Emelle, Alabama] site in 1977, Sumter
County was struggling with illiteracy and infant mortality rates that were
among the highest in the state, which in turn made them among the
highest in the nation. Over time, the landfill has brought revenue into
the county which has improved schools, built the fire station and the
town hall, improved health care delivery, provided employment, and re-
versed the percentages on illiteracy. In fact, in the first ten years of the
landfill's operation, the infant mortality rate in Sumter County was cut in
half. Three hundred people are currently employed at the Chem Waste
Emelle facility; the annual payroll is $10 million; and a portion of the
state tax on hazardous waste is given to Sumter County with a minimum
annual guarantee of $4.2 million to the county.
Seigler, supra note 93, at 64. See also Christopher Boerner & Thomas Lambert,
Environmental Injustice, THE PUB. IRlmST, Winter 1995, at 74 (regarding support
by local chapter of NAACP for construction of incinerator and waste landfill in
Brooksville, Mississippi due to economic benefits that would accrue).
101. See SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, FINAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (FEIS), CAMPO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT,
CAMPO INDIAN RESERVATION, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 1-7 (1992). This document
was prepared for U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sacramento
Area Office.
102. Id.
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would bring great economic benefits to the Campo Band. 03 Tribal
sources estimated that the landfill would directly create at least fifty-
five permanent jobs for at least thirty-five members of the Campo
Band, almost eliminating tribal unemployment.104 Here, the most
sustained and politically effective opposition to siting the landfill
has come from several white neighbors of the Campo
Reservation.' 05
Unfortunately, LULUs have been sited despite considerable
opposition from minority communities. Siting in the face of local
opposition, however, is not limited to minority communities. A
prominent example of LULU siting in spite of objections from non-
minority communities is the decision to place a high-level radioac-
tive waste repository in Nevada. 10 6 Conversely, other communities
with white majorities have lobbied to have facilities, which most
people would consider to be LULUs, sited in their jurisdictions in
order to gain jobs and other benefits during difficult economic
times. 10 7 In both situations, non-racial factors better explain the
outcomes than intentional or societal racism.
2. Contaminated sites
Most sites contaminated with hazardous waste are associated
with factories, gasoline stations, dry cleaners and other industrial or
commercial land uses located in urban areas. 08 Much of the haz-
103. Id. at 3-88. The reservation unemployment rate in 1990 was approxi-
mately sixty percent in a potential resident labor force of seventy people, versus a
county wide unemployment rate of approximately four percent. Id. Of tribal
members employed, less than half earned over $7,000 per year. Id. at 3-89. These
figures were thought to have improved in 1991, although hard data were not avail-
able. Id. A rise in tribal revenues was attributable to funds from the corporate
sponsor of the solid waste disposal facility, Mid-American Waste System, Inc. Id. at
3-88.
104. Id. at 4-78. The jobs would pay $15,000 - $20,000 for unskilled labor, and
more for skilled labor. Projected tribal income from disposal fees charged to users
was estimated as being approximately $50 million over a thirty year project life-
time. Id. At maximum use, this amount could double. Fifty percent of these reve-
nues would go to the tribal general fund for such purposes as housing, education,
health care, while the other fifty percent would go to economic development
projects. Id.
105. Interview with Muriel Waller, co-author of FEIS and attendee at public
meetings discussing the proposed project, (Mar. 10, 1995).
106. Foster Church, Can Nevada Keep America's Sizzling Nuclear Waste Out of Its
Backyard?, GOVERNING, Apr. 1990, at 21-24 (noting political weakness of Nevada's
Congressional delegation as key factor in state's designation as sole prospective
location for high-level radioactive waste repository over state objections).
107. E.g., Kenneth J. Garcia & David Perlman, Fighting for Lethal Leftovers, S.F.
CHRON., April 13, 1995, at A-1, A-10 to A-1I (discussing siting of plutonium storage
facilities).
108. See Gerrard, supra note 72, at 1090-91.
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ardous waste produced by these sources was disposed of at the fac-
tories where it was generated, in these urban areas. When factories
shut down, contaminated sites were often left behind. 109 Blacks in
particular are much more likely than Whites to live in these urban
areas.1 10 It is plausible that Blacks came to urban neighborhoods at
least in part because of the availability and proximity of jobs in in-
dustry."1 The minority population of urban neighborhoods may
have grown even after the shutdown of factories because of the
common tendency of people who move to different communities to
migrate to areas already settled by relatives and fellow ethnic group
members. Also, it is likely that the price of housing in these areas
has been lower than in less impacted suburban neighborhoods, and
economically depressed minority group members may have been
unable to move to more affluent settings.
Some environmental justice advocates have asserted that mi-
nority residential areas have been preferentially designated for in-
dustrial and commercial uses. 112 However, in some urban areas,
such as Baltimore, heavy industrial uses are located to a greater ex-
tent in non-minority communities.1 13 Further, lower-income Blacks
residing in Baltimore are concentrated in formerly middle-class
neighborhoods where industry has never existed." 4
Richmond, California has been described as exemplifying the
lack of fair geographic distribution in the siting of facilities. 1 5 Ac-
cording to one frequently cited study by Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment (CBE Report), "[a]ll of the lower income, minority
neighborhoods are in the western and southern parts of Richmond
109. One source found that towns with economic bases oriented toward in-
dustry are far more likely to have numerous dumpsites. MICHAEL R. GREENBERG &
RICHARD F. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY GAP 158 (1984);
see also Gerrard, supra note 72, at 1128 n.527. Prior to environmental regulation,
many industrial and commercial facilities may have disposed of waste on-site or
nearby because of the lower cost of doing so. Collin, supra note 54, at 509.
110. Lydia B. Duff, Beyond Environmental LULUs: Thoughts of an Urban Environ-
mental Lawyer, 5 MD.J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 49, 56 (1993-94) (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Collin, supra note 54, at 509 (stating that "[b]efore environmen-
tal regulation, many industrial and commercial facilities located in minority areas
113. Duff, supra note 110, at 56.
114. Id.
115. Tsao, supra note 29, at 372. See also Donna Gareis-Smith, Environmental
Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection to Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 64 (1994)
(comparing current racial composition of Richmond as whole (fifty percent black
and ten percent latino) with composition of neighborhoods closest to "the heaviest
industrial zone" (seventy-two percent to ninety-four percent black)).
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where the highest concentration of petrochemical facilities are also
located,"116 and "[t]his form of institutional discrimination has
been called 'environmental racism' by some community leaders."1 17
Upon a closer examination, however, it is difficult to assess the rela-
tive importance of racially discriminatory practices versus non-racial
factors when evaluating the proximity of minorities to contami-
nated sites in Richmond.
The CBE Report based its analysis on 1980 census data, and
did not look at racial demographic trends over time. However, the
industrial character of western and southern Richmond was estab-
lished long before Blacks or other minority groups became a sub-
stantial presence in the city. The black population of Richmond
numbered 29 out of approximately 6,800 in 1910, 33 out of approx-
imately 16,000 in 1920, and 270 out of approximately 24,000 in
1940.118 In 1940, the highest proportion of total minorities to the
total population within any Richmond census tract was 8.5 per-
cent.1 19 Some of the most important industries in the city were es-
tablished in western and southern Richmond before World War II,
when Richmond was still populated almost entirely by Whites.1 20
These included Santa Fe Railroad, Standard Oil and Pullman
Coach, all of which opened their Richmond operations between
1900 and 1910, and Kaiser Shipyard, which opened in 1941.121
Beginning around 1941, large numbers of black laborers from
the South came to the city to work at Kaiser and other industries. 122
116. Michael Belliveau et. al., Richmond at Risk: Community Demographics
and Toxic Hazards from Industrial Polluters 121 (1989) [hereinafter CBE
REPORT].
117. Id. at 2.
118. Shirley Ann Moore, THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
1910-1987 1, 3 (1989) (monograph on file with Richmond Public Library);
SANBORN MAP Co., RICHMOND, CoNrRA COSTA COuNTY, CAL. (1916).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION AND HOUSING STAT. FOR CENSUS
TRACTS, OAKLAND-BERKELEY, CAL. AND ADJACENT AREAS 57 (1940).
120. See Moore, supra note 118, at 3.
121. Id. at 35. Many other large and small industrial operations, including
foundries and chemical manufacturing concerns, also were located in southern
and western Richmond prior to 1920, and early fire insurance maps show few if
any major industrial facilities in other parts of the city. SANBORN MAP Co., RICH-
MOND, CONTRA-CosTA COUNTY, CAL. (1916). Industrial facilities located in west
and south Richmond as ofJune 1916 included the Union Super Phosphate Com-
pany, Stauffer Chemical Company, Santa Fe Foundry, Berkeley Steel Company,
Western Pipe and Steel Company, the Richmond Machine and Boiler Works and
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad shops and yards. Id.
122. Moore, supra note 118, at 35-36. Blacks were actively recruited by Kaiser
directly and by the Richmond Chamber of Commerce, as well as being drawn to
Richmond by personal networks. Id. Moreover, the city hosted fifty-five other war
industries besides Kaiser. Id. at 44.
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Due at least in part to segregation in housing, Blacks lived mostly in
western (and southern) Richmond and North Richmond.123 Of
these areas, most Blacks lived in North Richmond through at least
1945.124 In comparison with western and southern Richmond, this
northern area was not heavily industrialized. Although some manu-
facturing facilities were located there prior to World War II, North
Richmond consisted mostly of open fields and truck gardens into
the 1930s.125 Despite the arrival of many Blacks to the city, western
and southern Richmond did not become predominantly black until
the post-war years, when many Whites moved out of the city.
Whites were still a majority in every Richmond census tract in
1950.126 Even in the 1960 census, Whites were a majority in
eighteen out of twenty-two Richmond listings. 127 In only one North
Richmond tract and three western and southern Richmond tracts
were Blacks in the majority; Whites constituted substantial minori-
ties in the three western and southern Richmond tracts, of forty-
three percent, forty percent, and thirty-nine percent,
respectively. 128
The above data indicate that the presence of industrial sites in
areas of Richmond that are predominately black is not due to in-
dustries being preferentially located in black areas, but to their be-
ing preferentially located in industrial areas. Given that industrial
123. Id. at 22, 60-61. Moore, following common local practice, uses "west
Richmond" to encompass the southern portions of the city as well; thus, I have
placed the words "and southern" in parentheses in the text. Although technically
not within the city limits of Richmond proper, North Richmond was considered to
be part of Richmond by black residents of Richmond and North Richmond alike
during this period. Id. at 6, 36. North Richmond census tracts were included
under the heading "Richmond" in 1960 U.S. Census results, the first census to
show North Richmond tract data. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION AND
HOUSING STAT. FOR CENSUS TRACTS, SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, CAL. AND ADJACENT
AREAS 46-48 (1960).
124. Moore, supra note 118, at 24, 36.
125. Id. at 6-7; SANBORN MAP Co., RICHMOND, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CAL.
(1916). Companies located in North Richmond before the war included the
Certainteed Manufacturing Company, which manufactured roofing and mattress
products; Standard Sanitary, a company that made porcelain fixtures and which
was the biggest employer of Blacks in Richmond; and the Republic Steel Package
Company. Moore, supra note 118, at 9; SANBORN MAP Co., RICHMOND, CONTRA
COSTA COUNTY, CAL. (1916).
126. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION AND HOUSING STATISTICS FOR CEN-
SUS TRACTS, SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, CALIF. AND ADJACENT AREAS 22 (1950).
127. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS, supra note 123, at 46-48. By 1970,
Whites were a much smaller presence in these tracts (twenty-five percent, nine
percent, and six percent, respectively). U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION AND
HOUSING FOR CENSUS TRACTS, SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, CAL. AND ADJACENT AREAS.
28-30 (1972).
128. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS, supra note 123, at 46-48.
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uses were already concentrated in western and southern Richmond,
it is not surprising that this area became the favored location for
additional industries during and after the war. Western and south-
ern Richmond also have geographic advantages for some types of
industries.12 9 Sadly, it is also not surprising that these areas also are
the location of many contaminated sites, including several state and
National Priority List (Superfund) sites.'30
V. CRITIQUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REMEDIES
The core premises of environmental justice arguments are that
disparate impacts to minority communities from LULU siting are
widespread, and that racism during the siting process is the primary
cause of these disparate impacts. To deal with siting impacts upon
minority communities, environmental justice advocates seek to ap-
ply race-conscious solutions to change the outcomes of siting deci-
sions. However, as argued above, both of these premises are
debatable. Remedies based upon flawed premises should be
treated with suspicion by the courts, and, as will be discussed below,
the history of environmental justice litigation so far demonstrates
that courts have been reluctant to apply the reasoning of environ-
mental justice advocates. A further reason whyjudicial (and legisla-
tive) caution is warranted is that race-conscious remedies would
likely place unfair and adverse impacts upon non-minority
communities.
A. Disparate Impacts By Themselves Are Insufficient to Create a
Requirement that Projects be Halted
Courts have hesitated to overturn LULU sitings on the basis of
environmental justice considerations. In the words of an environ-
mental justice advocate, "[t]here is not yet a well-developed legal
doctrine that can be used effectively to combat environmental
racism." 131
129. As shown in maps in the CBE Report, almost all bulk petrochemical and
hazardous waste storage facilities in the city are located close to waterways used for
transportation: the Richmond Harbor Channel, Santa Fe Channel, San Pablo Bay
Channel, Lauritzen Channel, San Francisco Bay, all of which border west or south
Richmond. CBE REPORT, supra note, 116, at 58. The Santa Fe and Lauritzen
Channels in particular are major industrial locations. These locations are not la-
beled on the CBE map.
130. It is worth noting that the community of Point Richmond, which is
largely white, is closer to some of the major industrial facilities of Richmond (e.g.
Standard Oil Refinery) than are many Richmond minority neighborhoods.
131. Collin, supra note 54, at 818.
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1. Equal Protection
Litigation has been brought against LULU sitings based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which pro-
hibits a state from denying the equal protection of laws to any per-
son within its jurisdiction.13 2 Under the body of law interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause, the use of race or national origin as a
basis for the distribution of benefits or burdens by governmental
authorities is subject to strict scrutiny: 33 unless the authority con-
cerned can show that the classification is necessary to advance a
compelling governmental interest, and that the proposed action is
narrowly tailored to further that interest, the practice will be found
unconstitutional. 134 A crucial problem for environmental justice
advocates bringing suits based on the Equal Protection Clause is
that in order to prevail, plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent
on the part of the challenged agency. 135 Disparate impacts alone
are insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny absent a clear pattern of
impacts that fall more heavily on one race than another and that
cannot be explained on grounds other than race. 136 To date, no
court has found that plaintiffs challenging a LULU siting have
made the requisite showing of discriminatory intent.137
In Washington v. Davis138 the Supreme Court rejected a dispa-
rate impact claim, holding that disparate results themselves are not
illegal and do not trigger strict scrutiny, whereby "racial classifica-
tions are [subject] ... to the strictest scrutiny and are.. . justifiable
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
133. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
134. Id.
135. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 & 242 (1976).
136. Id.
137. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979) (concluding that the plaintiffs did not establish a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights because they never proved discriminatory purpose). See also Collin,
supra note 59, at 518 (stating "[t]here is not yet a well-developed legal doctrine
that can be used to effectively combat environmental racism").
138. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, two African-American men
filed suit after learning that their job applications were rejected. Id. at 232. Their
suit alleged that the application process, particularly a written test given to deter-
mine applicants verbal skills was discriminatory. Id. at 233-34. The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 234. The Court of
Appeals reversed and directed summaryjudgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 237. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
Id. at 238. The Court held that the test, which had been created by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission and given to applicants for federal employment, was not racially
discriminatory. Id. at 245. The Court noted that many other African-American
applicants had successfully completed the test, and concluded that the employ-
ment test was not fatally discriminatory. Id. at 252.
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only by the weightiest of considerations." 13 9 The Davis Court held
that strict scrutiny is triggered by intentional discrimination.14 0
Similarly, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp.,14' the Court stated that a disparate impact resulting
from governmental policies is not clear proof of discrimination. 42
"[An] official action will not be held unconstitutional solely be-
cause it results in a racially disproportionate impact."' 43 Dispropor-
tionate impacts may be evidence of discrimination, but impact
alone does not amount to an intent or purpose to discriminate. 144
As described by the Court in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney,' 45 if neutral laws have "a disproportionate adverse effect
upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional ... only if that impact
139. Id. at 242 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
140. Id.
141. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, an Illinois non-profit devel-
oper brought suit after the city's planning commission refused to rezone his tract
of land from single-family to a multi-family classification. Id. The developer's suit
alleged that the rezoning request was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 252. The district
court found that the denial was motivated by a desire to protect the neighboring
property values and was not racially motivated. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed "finding that the 'ultimate effect' of the rezoning denial
was racially discriminatory and observing that denial would disproportionately af-
fect blacks." Id. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the developer failed to
prove a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose." Id. at 265. The Court found
that the zoning policies were in effect before the developer's request for zoning
and were consistent with established policies and precedent. Id. at 267.
142. Id. at 264.
143. Id. at 264-65.
144. Id. at 265. As stated by the Court, "[i]n many instances, to recognize the
limited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the
'heterogeneity' of the Nation's population." Id. at 266 n.15. The Court recog-
nized, however, that judicial deference is unjustifiable when "a discriminatory pur-
pose" serves as a motivating factor in the legislative process. Id. at 265. Factors
suggested by the Court that may be taken into account in deciding whether dis-
criminatory intent existed are the historical background of the decision, particu-
larly if official actions were taken for invidious purposes; the specific sequence of
events leading up to the decision; procedural or substantive departures from nor-
mal procedures; and the legislative and administrative history of the decision. Id.
at 267-68.
145. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). In Feeney, a female employee challenged a Massa-
chusetts statute that gave promotional preference to civil servants who were veter-
ans. Id. The plaintiff, who performed better on the civil service exam than many
veterans was ranked below those veteran applicants. Id. Her suit alleged that "the
absolute-preference formula. . . operate[d] to exclude women ... and thus dis-
criminate[d] against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The statute was declared unconstitional by a three
judge panel. Id. On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court affirmed
their previous decision, finding "that the consequences of the . . . preference
formula... [was] too inevitable to have been 'unintended.'" Id. at 257.
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can be traced to a discriminatory purpose."'1 The fact that a gov-
ernmental unit adopts a legitimate policy with the awareness that
discriminatory impacts will result does not in itself satisfy the re-
quirement of discriminatory intent or purpose. 147
Particularly relevant to the issue of environmental justice is
that the Supreme Court does not recognize poverty as a suspect
classification requiring application of the strict scrutiny test.' 48 As a
result, the disproportionate existence of LULU sites in impover-
ished areas does not justify the application of strict scrutiny.1 49 En-
vironmental justice advocates have not been successful in
differentiating between disparate siting impacts caused by poverty,
and the putative effects of race upon siting.
Applying the preceding principles, several jurisdictions have
rejected Equal Protection claims aimed at halting the siting of LU-
LUs. 150 In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,15 ' the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas refused to issue an
injunction that would halt the siting of a waste disposal facility after
Plaintiffs were unable to show that the siting criteria were racially
discriminatory. 152 The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar position
146. Id. at 272.
147. Id. at 279. "'Discriminatory purpose' ... implies that the decisionmaker
selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. (citations
omitted).
148. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In San
Antonio School District, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether the Texas
school system discriminated on the basis of wealth in the manner in which educa-
tion is provided and if wealth is a suspect classification. Id. at 19-21. The Texas
public school system relied in part on local tax dollars to fund school districts. Id.
at 4. The plaintiff alleged that this system had a disproportionate impact upon
poor minority-majority school districts. Id. at 28. The Court, per Justice Powell,
stated "this Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone pro-
vides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny." Id. at 29. The Court refused
to "intrude into an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures."
Id. at 40.
149. Id. at 41. "[T]he presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes." Id.
150. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673
(S.D. Tex. 1979); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (lth Cir. 1989); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,
997 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1992).
151. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
152. Id. In Bean, the residents of a Houston neighborhood sought an injunc-
tion to stop the operation of a waste management facility. Id. at 674-75. The dis-
trict court denied the request. Id. at 681. The district court looked past the basic
statistics offered by the plaintiffs and determined that the criteria established by
the waste disposal company were not based on racial discrimination. Id. at 678-79.
The site was located near the Houston Ship Channel, where many of Houston's
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in East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb County Planning
& Zoning Commission,153 holding that absent purposeful racial dis-
crimination, the siting of a waste disposal facility in a minority
neighborhood did not establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.15 4 In R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay,155 the Fourth Circuit stated that
insensitivity by a planning commission does not amount to a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.1 56 In summary, as stated by the
Bean court, to succeed in an action alleging a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, "plaintiffs must show notjust that the decision to
grant a permit is objectionable or even wrong, but that [the siting
decision] is attributable to an intent to discriminate on the basis of
race."
1 57
Environmental justice advocates disagree with the preceding
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to one
proponent, the requirement to show discriminatory intent "ignores
the history of institutional racism in the United States ... and ex-
poses the white bias underlying the prevailing theory of 'colorblind-
ness' and 'race-neutral criteria' in [the] equal protection
doctrine."1 58 Some advocates have proposed that the meaning of
discriminatory intent be redefined. For example, one advocate
minority neighborhoods were situated. Id. at 679. The court concluded that the
plaintiffs did not prove "that the decision to grant the permit was motivated by
purposeful racial discrimination." Id. at 678.
153. 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
154. Id. The residents of a predominately black census tract in Macon, Geor-
gia brought suit against the Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission
claiming that the commission had denied them equal protection of the law when
the commission decided to locate a landfill in a neighborhood that would affect
more blacks than whites. Id. at 1265. The district court determined that the com-
mission did not act with an intent to discriminate. Id. at 1266. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's findings. Id. at 1267.
155. 997 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1992).
156. Id. After the Planning Commission adopted a resolution approving the
rezoning of a predominately minority neighborhood from agricultural to indus-
trial, a citizens group filed suit, claiming that the commission had violated the
residents right to equal protection. RLI.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D.
Va. 1991). The district court stated that "the Supervisors appear to have been
more concerned about the economic and legal plight of the County . . . rather
than the sentiments of residents who opposed the placement of the landfill ......
Id. at 1150. In entering judgment for the defendant, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to equalize
the impact of official decisions on different racial groups. RLS.E. v. Kay, 977 F.2d
at 573.
157. Bean, 482 F. Supp at 677.
158. SeeJames H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing EnvironmentalJustice
Through Title VY of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 125, 151-52
(1994) (citing Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. Riv. 1049
(1978)).
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proposed that if an action is "racially significant"-if it "conveys a
symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial signifi-
cance"-a plaintiff challenging a project need not go further to
show discriminatory intent. 159 According to this source, "[b] ecause
the government decision-makers are part of our culture, any deci-
sion they make is necessarily influenced by racial considera-
tions.' 6° The logical result of this analysis would be that any action
with adverse affects upon minorities, especially if the effects are dis-
tributed disparately across racial groups, becomes discriminatory
and satisfies the intent requirement. To date, no court has adopted
this revised understanding of discriminatory intent.
2. Title VI
To overcome the hurdle of proving discriminatory intent in
Equal Protection-based claims, many environmental justice advo-
cates have suggested litigation based on Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.161 This law provides that no person shall be excluded
on the basis of race, color or national origin, from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal assistance.' 6 2 Regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI, regarding programs receiving
assistance from EPA, state that recipients shall not use criteria or
methods of administering their programs which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
national origin or sex;163 nor shall recipients choose a site or loca-
tion of a facility that has the purpose or effect of excluding individ-
uals, denying these individuals benefits or subjecting them to
discrimination on the grounds of race, color, national origin or
sex.164 Programs receiving federal financial assistance can in some
circumstances be found to be in violation of Title VI where dispa-
rate impacts are found, even if discriminatory intent cannot be es-
tablished. 165  Under Title VI, proponents have successfully
compelled municipalities to provide additional services to minority
159. Collin, supra note 54, at 536.
160. Id.
161. Title VI § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
162. Id. See also Gareis-Smith, supra note 115, at 57 (discussing litigation
under Title VI).
163. 40 C.F.R § 7.35(b) (1995).
164. Id. § 7.35(c).
165. This principle was established regarding private actions under Title VI in
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) and Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n
of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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neighborhoods, where such services were substantially inferior to
those in non-minority communities. 166
Title VI has obvious attractions for prospective litigants be-
cause state and local environmental programs often receive federal
funding. For example, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA)
filed a Title VI-based complaint with EPA's Civil Rights Division
against a broad array of California state agencies and private
waste management firms.167 The complaint alleged discrimination
against Hispanic communities when siting and expanding hazard-
ous waste sites.168 CRLA sought an immediate moratorium on the
expansion of such sites in Latino communities.1 6
9
Neither EPA nor the Department ofJustice have specified what
type of state action regarding hazardous waste programs receiving
federal funding would constitute a Title VI violation.170 Despite the
lack of overall guidelines, EPA has undertaken several Title VI ac-
tions. 171 From approximately October 1993 until December 1994,
more than twenty administrative complaints alleging environmental
racism were filed with EPA under Title VI, nine of which EPA ac-
cepted for investigation. 172
Despite the features of Title VI that make it attractive to envi-
ronmental justice advocates, its applicability to LULU siting re-
mains unsettled. While Title VI-based actions have been successful
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, Fla., 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla.
1978). Minorities in the municipality of Arcadia, Florida brought suit alleging that
the city had violated their rights by depriving them of equal municipal services.
The suit did not assert a 14th Amendment claim. Id. In granting relief, the Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida held that minorities deserve access
similar to whites to all municipal facilities. Id. at 1378. A municipality that elects
to provide services may not provide inferior sewer, city water, paved streets, fire
hydrants and recreational facilities to minorities as compared with whites. Id.
167. Environmental Justice Complaint Against Cal/EPA, INSIDE CAL/EPA - ENVI-
RONMENTAL TRACKING SERVICE, Feb. 17, 1995, at 12.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. States May Develop Guidance for Handing Title VI Complaints, INSIDE EPA
ENVIRONMENTAL PoucY ALERT, Feb. 1, 1995, at 32. The EPA Office of Civil Rights
is developing guidance for states to handle Title VI complaints. Id.
171. Id. For example, in 1993, the EPA Office of Civil Rights investigated
whether state environmental authorities in Louisiana and Mississippi were violat-
ing Tide VI when they approved permits for hazardous waste facilities in minority
neighborhoods. Lavelle, supra note 39 at 41. In the Louisiana case, the site was in
a heavy industrial zone. In contrast, the Mississippi site was free of hazardous waste
pollution. Id.
172. Luke W. Cole, Foreword: Ajeremiad on Environmental Justice and the Law, 14
STAN. ENVrL. L.J. ix, x (1995).
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in contesting disparate impacts in some instances173 they have
failed in others, including one case, described below, that con-
cerned a contested land use.
In Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian,174 the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that Title VI
does not per se prohibit actions creating disparate impacts. Rather,
it prohibits only those actions causing a disparate impact without
adequate justification.175 Once a plaintiff has established a prima
facie case that some definite, measurable disparate impact is pres-
ent, the defendant can counter with a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its action.176 If the plaintiff offers an alternative method
which accomplishes the same goal and that would not have an ob-
jectionable impact (such as siting the offending project in a non-
minority neighborhood), the defendants can rebut a prima facie
case of discrimination by demonstrating that such an alternative
method would not accomplish the objective sought.177
In summary, to survive Title VI challenges, LULU proponents
should be prepared to document their use of legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory siting criteria, and to document their conformance to a
decision-making process that brings forward and analyzes a reason-
able range of alternatives. Siting is far more defensible where it
includes extensive public involvement and objective consideration
of alternatives which have lesser impacts upon minority groups.
3. Other Civil Rights Statutes
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,178 the Supreme Court made
it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in Title VII Civil Rights Act
173. See NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333-35 (3d Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the result of a hospital merger proposal would
have a disparate impact upon minority communities. Id. at 1326. The district
court found that the defendants had failed to show a feasible less discriminatory
alternative. Id. at 1328. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff did
not have to show intentional discrimination. Id. The court stated "proof of dispa-
rate impact or effects is sufficient" to show a violation under Title VI. Id.
174. 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
175. Id. at 127 (stating Title VI only prohibits actions that have "differential
impact without adequate justification"). In Damian, the city of Columbus, Ohio
decided to construct a highway and plaintiffs filed a suit alleging that the highway
would have a disproportionate impact upon minorities and was a violation of Title
VI. Id. at 112-13. The district court determined that the Planning Commission
failed to satisfy the public involvement requirement but that the Commission's
actions were not discriminatory. Id. at 128-29. As a result, the court failed to grant
the injunction sought by the plaintiffs.
176. Id. at 127.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
32
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss1/3
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
cases by holding that disparate impacts alone are not evidence of
discrimination.1 79 In response, Congress amended Title VII enact-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,180 which redefines the burden of
proof regarding disparate impact.18' Under this Act, an unlawful
employment practice based on disparate impact is established if a
complaining party demonstrates that a particular employment prac-
tice causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, and the defendant fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity.' 82 If a defendant does make
this demonstration, the plaintiff can still prevail by presenting evi-
dence that an alternate employment practice without similar dispa-
rate impacts would also serve the employer's legitimate interests,
and the defendant refuses to implement such a practice. 183
Title VII case law has frequently been cited in Title VI cases.1 84
However, the applicability of Title VII to Title VI-based environ-
mental justice challenges has yet to be determined. Some courts,
notably NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,18 5 have applied to Title VI
cases a standard used in Title VII cases: if the defendant is able to
179. Id. In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the Court
of Appeals, which had relied on statistical inferences to find that the defendant's
hiring practices were discriminatory. Id. at 659-62. The statistics put forth by the
plaintiff were not, the Supreme Court decided, evidence of discrimination. Id. at
656. The decision required the judiciary to "proceed with care before mandating
that an employer.., adopt... alternative ... hiring practice [s]." Id. at 661. The
Court's rationale for limiting its review was that "[c] ourts are generally less compe-
tent than employers to restructure business practices." Id. (citations omitted).
180. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1) (A) (1994)).
181. Id. After the revisions, the burden of proof in disparate impact actions is
established if:
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a partic-
ular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
Id.
182. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
183. Id. at § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (ii) (1994). See Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (stating employers failure to adopt alterna-
tive proposal which eliminated disparate impacts while still meeting employer's
business interests was evidence employer used its tests as pretext for discrimina-
tion). See also Colopy, supra note 158, at 164 n.177.
184. See Colopy, supra note 158, at 160 n.158.
185. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
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provide evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
action, the plaintiff can in turn rebut by offering evidence that the
proffered legitimate reason is a mere pretext for the discriminatory
action. 186 This can be done by showing that other selection devices
without a similar undesirable effect would also serve the legitimate
interest of the defendant. 87 Other courts, such as Bryan v. Koch,'88
have not used this standard, and the NAACP court did not reach a
conclusion as to whether this standard was necessarily applicable in
all Title VI claims.18 9
Even under Title VII, plaintiffs must still overcome substantial
hurdles to prevail on causes of action based solely on evidence of
disparate impacts. Tide VII does not demand that an employer give
preferential treatment to minorities. Rather, the employer has dis-
cretion to choose equally qualified candidates, provided the deci-
sion is not based upon unlawful criteria. A defendant is not
required to prove that the employee selected is the best qualified,
or to select a minority applicant whenever that person's objective
qualifications are equal to those of a white candidate. Analogous to
Title VI, the employee's prima facie case of discrimination is rebut-
186. Id. at 1336.
187. Id.
188. 657 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). The Bryan court clearly described the
problems of applying Title VII reasoning to Title VI cases:
The consideration of alternatives that has occurred in Title VII cases is
instructive as to the appropriate standard for challenges under Tide VI.
Title VII cases typically involve a challenge to a particular selection de-
vice, frequently an examination. If the selection device has a disparate
racial impact, there is a compelling argument for prohibiting its use, de-
spite its job-relatedness, if another device will also select qualified employ-
ees and have a lesser disparate impact. In that context the inquiry is
sharply focused upon comparable alternatives, other selection proce-
dures or examinations. With Title VI, however,, the inquiry could fre-
quently become too open-ended. If, for example, a court were to assess
alternative ways of saving funds throughout administration of a city or
even throughout administration of the health care function, it would seri-
ously risk substituting its own judgment for that of the city's elected offi-
cials and appointed specialists. We are skeptical of the capacity and
appropriateness of courts to conduct such broad inquiries concerning al-
ternative ways to carry out municipal functions. Once a court is drawn
into such a complex inquiry, it will inevitably be assessing the wisdom of
competing political and economic alternatives. Moreover, such policy
choices would be made without broad public participation and without
sufficient assurance that the alternative selected will ultimately provide
more of a benefit to the minority population.
Id. at 619.
189. See NAACP v. Medical Center, 657 F.2d at 1336-37. The court in NAACP
stated that this test was a stringent standard that "more than adequately serves Tide
VI aims"; it also cited Bryan without stating any disagreement with the Bryan court's
approach in not applying the same test. Id.
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ted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action. To sat-
isfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce
admissible evidence which would allow a trier of fact to rationally
conclude that the employment decision was not motivated by dis-
criminatory animus. 190
Some environmental justice advocates 91 have also proposed
applying other civil rights statutes to halt LULU facility siting, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1982,192 which states that all citizens shall have the
same right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property; and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,193
which bars discrimination in sale or rental of housing or in provi-
sion of services or facilities in connection therewith. 194 Plaintiffs
have to overcome major hurdles in order to use these statutes to
overturn LULU facility siting actions. First it is debatable whether
disparate impacts in LULU siting interfere with the rights enumer-
ated in the plain wording of these statutes. Regarding Title VIII,
for example, this statute does not purport to bar discrimination in
the distribution of services generally, and deals only with discrimi-
nation in the realm of fair housing opportunities, and services or
facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling.1 95
Second, even if courts were to accept challenges to LULU sit-
ing under these statutes, the presence of disparate impacts alone
would not guarantee success for plaintiffs. To establish a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for
a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the defendant's actions
were racially motivated.' 96 As is true for plaintiffs bringing Equal
190. Texas Dept. of Comm. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 258, 259 (1981) (holding
when plaintiff proves prima face case of discrimination, defendant need only ex-
plain nondiscriminatory reasons behind employment decision).
191. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FoRDRAm UB. L.J. 523, 534-38 (1994); Lazarus, Pursing Environ-
mentalJustice, supra note 1, at 839-42.
192. R.S. § 1978, 14 Stat. 27, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994)) (R.S.
§ 1978 is from an Act of April 9, 1866 that discusses property rights of citizens).
193. Fair Housing Act of 1968 §§ 101-1001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619, 3631 (1994)).
194. Cole, supra note 191, at 523 (recognizing that there have been no re-
ported cases involving Title VIII but that Title VIII offers another basis for environ-
mental justice claims). Title VIII "bars the refusal 'to sell or rent ... or otherwise
make available, or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status or national origin,' and bars discrimination 'against any person
in the ... sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection there with, because of race, religion, sex, familial status or national
origin.'" Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
195. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice, supra note 1, at 840 (discussing
possibility of using Tide VIII for environmental purposes).
196. See Cho v. Itco, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
1997]
35
Kevin: Environmental Racism and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A Critiqu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
156 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 121
Protection claims, plaintiffs seeking redress under this statute must
establish proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 197
Once a prima facie case of discriminatory intent is made out, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that his other actions were
not racially motivated, or that there is some legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for those actions.198 Regarding Title VIII, disparate
impacts alone are sufficient to establish a primafacie violation of the
statute, and plaintiffs do not need to prove discriminatory intent. 199
However, defendants can prevail by showing that there was no less
discriminatory alternative available, and that the justification was
bona fide and legitimate.200
B. Siting of LULUs on the Basis of Avoiding Racially Disparate
Impacts Would Lead to Preferential Siting in Non-
Minority Communities
Conflicts over LULU siting can be lessened by lowering the
number of LULUs that must be sited, for example, through waste
reduction and recycling efforts. However, some irreducible
number of LULUs must be sited somewhere. Most environmental
justice advocates argue that minority populations should not host
LULUs to a greater extent than their percentage of the popula-
tion. 201 Few advocates have been explicit regarding the proportion
of LULUs that should be hosted by white communities. However,
while many advocates disclaim an intention to preferentially site
LULUs in non-minority communities, 20 2 environmental justice ra-
tionales and remedies exert strong pressures against locating LU-
LUs in minority areas. As stated by two commentators, "[m]ost of
the environmental justice initiatives now being considered attempt
to alleviate environmental inequities by forcing polluting and waste
facilities to operate in wealthier, non-minority areas."20 3
197. See Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council Inc. v. City of New York, 695 F.
Supp. 1531, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
198. Cho, 782 F. Supp. at 1187.
199. Soules v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d
Cir. 1992).
200. Stiykers Bay, 695 F. Supp. at 1543.
201. See, e.g., Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity:
A Proposed Siting Model, 12 VA. Eiv-rL. L.J. 375, 411 (1994)(viewing methods em-
ployed by states to site LULUs as problematic "because they do not promote the
equal distribution of such facilities across race, ethnic and income groups").
202. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 97, at 449; DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 12, at
126.
203. Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Letter, 36 ENV'T, October
1994, at 2-3.
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Preferential siting in white communities can be justified in sev-
eral ways. It can be argued, for example, that minorities should
bear lesser burdens in order to compensate for past discrimination
in LULU siting in particular, or for past and on-going generalized
discrimination. In this conception, a fair distribution of LULUs re-
quires "advantaged" neighborhoods to bear a greater share of
LULUs than minority neighborhoods to make up for past discrimi-
nation against minorities. Since minority communities also suffer
disproportionately from ills other than LULUs, such as poorer
health and less mobility, to help equalize the overall burdens borne
by different communities, and to distribute impacts equally, a rela-
tively larger share of LULUs should be sited in non-minority
neighborhoods. 204
Probably more important than theoretical justifications, how-
ever, are bureaucratic and political considerations. There are pres-
ently no formal federal prohibitions against siting LULUs in
minority neighborhoods. However, bureaucracies with environ-
mental justice responsibilities are being created in each agency,20 5
and due to Executive Order 12,898 and other pressures, federal sit-
ing proposals which impact minority communities come under a
higher level of scrutiny than do proposals which impact primarily
white areas. This creates incentives for project managers to favor
siting in non-minority areas. 206
Depending upon the evolution of laws, regulations and court
cases, incentives could also be created for private sector actors to
site LULUs in non-minority areas. Persons opposing the siting of
LULUs in minority areas could have new grounds for legal chal-
lenges, with lawsuits against siting in minority areas encouraged.
The concomitant logistical and monetary hurdles that industry
204. These arguments are summarized in Vicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in
Proposals for Facility Siting, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 13, 18-19 (1993-94).
Another rationale for reducing the burdens of LULUs upon minorities can be
inferred from a contention by Bullard that "[wi aste generation is directly corre-
lated with per capita income; however, few waste facilities are proposed and actu-
ally built in the mostly white suburbs." DUMPING IN DixIE, supra note 12, at 102. As
minorities are disproportionately poorer than whites, it is likely that less waste is
attributable to minority groups than is represented by their proportion of the over-
all population. A logical extension of this argument is that minorities should bear
fewer burdens in the siting of waste facilities than their share of the population
would otherwise dictate.
205. For a discussion of federal administrative attempts to address environ-
mental justice, see supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
206. Further research in this area is necessary, although it could well prove
difficult to convince agency employees to come forward publicly with such
observations.
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would encounter could significantly affect business decisions, 20 7
and make siting in white communities more attractive than would
otherwise be the case if solely technical criteria were employed.
VI. CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS SHOULD
EMPHASIZE RACE-NEUTRAL CRITERIA
Many advocates see environmental justice as part of the
broader struggle to achieve "racial and social justice."20 8 It is debat-
able, however, whether the definition ofjustice held by these advo-
cates is a view held by the majority of people in our society. While
no opinion polls were found bearing on the specific question of
whether it would be desirable to introduce racial criteria into siting
decisions, polling results clearly show that in other settings, prefer-
ential treatment based upon race is objectionable to the great ma-
jority of respondents.20 9 This opposition was recently manifested in
the passage of the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI),210 on
November 5, 1996, by the California electorate, as an amendment
to the California Constitution. The CCRI prohibits the State and its
political subdivisions from using race, sex, color, ethnicity or na-
tional origin as a criterion for either discriminating against or
granting preferential treatment to any individual or group in the
207. Stephen C. Jones, Inequities of Industrial Siting Addressed, NAT'L L.J., Au-
gust 16, 1993, at 20.
208. Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City: Lessons for the Movement, 5
MD.J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL IssuEs 67, 78 n.44 (1993-94).
209. See Gallup Poll: Preferential Job Hiring Opposed, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 1981,
reprinted in Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee in the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., on S.J. 41 at 1050-51 (1981).
Majority opposition to racial preferences is of long standing. Gallup Polls, dated
May, 1977, October 1977, and December 1980, that surveyed attitudes on affirma-
tive action found that over eighty percent of the respondents opposed preferential
treatment. Gallup concluded that "[r] arely is public opinion, particularly on such
a controversial subject, as united as it is over this question." Id. at 1050. More
recent results include a 1994 study by the National Opinion Research Center
which found that only sixteen percent of respondents endorsed preferences for
Blacks in hiring and promotion. See David K. Shipler, My Equal Opportunity, Your
Free Lunch, NEw YORK TIMES, March 5, 1995, at 4-1. Seventy-five percent of those
polled in a 1995 Washington Post-ABC News poll (including eighty-one percent of
Whites and forty-six percent of Blacks) answered no to the question, "Do you think
that blacks and other minorities should receive preferences in hiring, promotions
and college admissions to make up for past discrimination." Richard Morin, No
Place for Calm and Quiet Opinions, WASHINGTON POST NATIONAL WEEKLY EDITION,
April 24-30, 1995, at 34.
210. California Ballot Pamphlet for the General Election, California Civil
Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 (1996).
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operation of the State's system of public employment, public educa-
tion or public contracting. 21'
Based on these indicators, it is likely that most people would
see the use of racial criteria to supersede technical factors in siting
decisions as unfair. A fair siting process would be one in which
minority communities would be no more and no less likely to be
selected than other areas that have equal suitability. People hold
widely differing conceptions of what constitutes fairness in siting.212
Still, most people would likely agree that to be equitable, decision-
making should at the minimum be informed by the following prin-
ciples: (1) strict adherence to defensible technical siting criteria
relating to the safety of sites; (2) absence of animus against any pop-
ulation grouping, especially groupings based on race or ethnicity,
as a motivation in siting decisions; and (3) avoiding siting decisions
that result in concentration of LULUs in too circumscribed a geo-
graphic area.213 The third principle is the most difficult to specify
and, depending upon the dispute, the definition of "too circum-
scribed an area" can be a neighborhood, city, state or even a multi-
state region. However, the principle itself is crucial to fairness.
An example of a racially-neutral approach that attempted to
address the third principle was the proposed Environmental Justice
Act of 1992, which after several attempts failed to pass either the
House or the Senate.21 4 The 1993 version of this Act would have
required EPA to identify the one hundred counties or other geo-
graphical units in the United States containing the highest total
weight of toxic chemicals. Those areas would be classified as Envi-
ronmental High Impact Areas (EHIAs). The Act would require a
health impact study to evaluate "the nature and extent, if any, of
211. Id. While the CCRI does not specifically address the use of racial criteria
in LULU siting, some of the remedies suggested by environmental justice advo-
cates would clearly be contrary to the intent of this initiative in situations where
racial animus cannot be demonstrated. In practical effect, the CCRI may bar the
use of racial criteria if public contracting was involved in site selection and prefer-
ential treatment was inherent in the criteria used in site selection.
212. See Been, Conceptions of Fairness, supra note 204 (discussing various mod-
els to address LULU sitings).
213. The following may also be added: A LULU should be sited in the same
geographic area(s) experiencing the benefits which generate the need to site the
LULU in the first place. This consideration underlies attempts by communities
and states to ban out-of-area radioactive, solid or hazardous wastes. This is more
problematic than the other principles, as the safest sites may be in remote areas
that generate very little waste. Other principles that have been extensively ex-
plored in LULU siting literature include compensating communities or individuals
for the burdens brought by LULUs, and choosing among equally suitable sites by
some form of lottery.
214. See H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993).
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acute and chronic impacts on human health" in EHIAs as com-
pared to other counties. If the study found "significant adverse im-
pacts on environmental pollution on human health" in EHIAs, a
moratorium would be declared on the siting or permitting of any
new facilities in an EHIA that would release toxic substances in
quantities found to cause significant adverse impacts on human
health.
Environmental justice advocates identify racism as the cause of
disparate impacts. However, the concept of Occam's razor should
be applied: the simplest of competing theories which adequately
explain a phenomenon should be preferred. If the same non-racial
factors can explain the presence of LULUs in non-minority and mi-
nority communities alike, logic dictates that race should neither be
taken as the primary explanation for siting outcomes nor form the
basis for remedies. If poverty rather than racial bias is a crucial
factor in siting decisions, race-neutral remedies focusing on low in-
come communities in general would be appropriate.
The current focus of environmental justice advocates on dispa-
rate impacts should be replaced by a race-neutral approach to limit
the impacts placed upon any community. To the extent that mi-
norities currently suffer greater burdens from LULUs, such an ap-
proach would likely benefit minority more than white communities.
Additionally, race-neutral measures will be far more acceptable to
the public and the courts alike.
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